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Abstract—The deterministic (timing) behavior of real-time
systems (RTS) can be used by adversaries – say, to launch side-
channel attacks or even destabilize the system by denying access
to critical resources. We propose a protocol (named REORDER)
to obfuscate this predictable timing behavior of RTS, especially
ones designed using dynamic-priority scheduling algorithms
(e.g., EDF). We also present a metric (named “schedule entropy”)
that measures the levels of obfuscation introduced into a given
real-time system. The REORDER protocol was integrated into
the standard Linux real-time scheduler and evaluated on a
realistic embedded platform (Raspberry Pi) running the MiBench
automotive benchmark workloads. We also demonstrate how
designers of RTS can increase the security of their systems and
also quantitatively measure the impact (both in terms of security
and performance) of using this protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems with real-time properties are often engineered to
be very predictable[1]. This is necessary for their correct
operation and ensuring safety guarantees. Most real-time sys-
tems (RTS) are designed to execute repeating jobs (either
periodic or sporadic1 ones) that have explicit “deadline”
requirements. Hence, the schedule repeats. Any deviations
in timing behavior, for the real-time schedule, can result in
the system becoming unstable – thus, adversely affecting
the safety of the system. Adversaries can take advantage of
this inherent determinism by focusing their attacks on the
schedulers in real-time systems [2], [3]. Traditionally, security
has always been an afterthought in the design of RTS but that
is changing with the advent of high-profile attacks (e.g., denial-
of-service attacks using Internet-of-Things devices [4], Stuxnet
[5], BlackEnergy [6], etc.). The increase usage of commodity-
off-the-shelf (COTS) components along with emerging tech-
nologies (e.g., IoT) only exacerbates security problems in RTS.
Hence, the scheduler in RTS is a critical component for
maintaining the integrity of the system. In fact, the pre-
dictable behavior can be used to improve the security of
such systems [7], [8], [9], [10]. On the other hand, there
are significant vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit
due to the repeating nature of the real-time task schedules.
Consider the spectrum analysis of a 4-task real-time system
(from Example 1 introduced in Section III-A) using discrete
Fourier transforms (DFT) (Fig. 1a). An adversary can easily
reconstruct the execution frequencies (and hence, periods) of
all four real-time tasks (annotated by the red arrows) from
∗These authors contributed equally to this work.
1Jobs with bounded inter-arrival times.
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(a) Frequency Spectrum of the EDF Schedule
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(b) Frequency Spectrum of the Obfuscated Schedule
Fig. 1: Results of the frequency spectrum analysis for execution
sequences scheduled by: (a) a deterministic scheduler (e.g., Vanilla
EDF) and (b) randomized scheduler (REORDER). A taskset con-
sisting of 4 periodic tasks is considered and the 4 arrows (in
red) in each plot indicate their true frequencies (i.e., Fi = 1Ti ={50,100,125,200} Hz where Ti is the inter-arrival time of the tasks.)
this information! Such information can be used to launch
other attacks2 – e.g., scheduler side-channels that can then
be used to leak critical information [2], [3] or deny critical
services, power consumption [11], schedule preemptions [12],
electromagnetic (EM) emanations [13] and temperature [14],
etc. In fact, defensive techniques for RTS is fairly limited [15],
[16], [17], [7], [8], [9], [18], [10].
Obfuscating the schedules, i.e., introducing randomness into
the execution patterns of real-time tasks, could be one way to
improve the security of RTS. This must be done in a careful
manner, so as to not interfere with the timing guarantees
that the system can provide, while still introducing diversity
into the schedule. Figure 1b shows the results of applying
our randomization protocol (introduced next) to the same 4-
task example mentioned earlier. As the figure shows, DFT
analysis applied to an obfuscated schedule results in less
regular execution patterns – hence, it is harder to identify the
frequencies of two of the tasks (second and third red arrows),
thus thwarting some of the potential attacks mentioned earlier.
We propose a schedule randomization protocol (Section
III) that we named REORDER (REal-time ObfuscateR for
Dynamic SchedulER). We achieve this by using bounded
priority inversions at runtime (see Section III-A for more
2Attackers can launch these attacks with greater accuracy/success since they
can predict exactly when the victim tasks are released based on the information
presented in Fig. 1a.
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details). REORDER obfuscates the earliest deadline first (EDF)
scheduling policy [19]; EDF is a dynamic task scheduler that
can, theoretically, utilize a CPU to its fullest. It is widely
supported by many real-world RTS and operating systems,
e.g., Erika Enterprise [20], RTEMS [21], etc. and even Linux
[22]. Existing work on protecting real-time schedulers [23],
[24] is (a) focused on static scheduling algorithms and (b) in-
adequate for measuring the effects of obfuscation. Obfuscating
the schedules for dynamic priority algorithms such as EDF,
to achieve a high level of randomization, is a much harder
proposition than that for static algorithms. One important prob-
lem is how to bound the time allocated for allowing priority
inversions since the job deadlines dynamically change as the
execution proceeds3. REORDER guarantees that if a given
real-time system was schedulable (i.e., meets all of its timing
and deadline constraints) by the vanilla EDF scheduler, then
the obfuscated schedule will also meet the same guarantees.
A challenge in any security framework is to measure the
effectiveness of the solution. In this case, designers of RTS
need to estimate the amount of randomness introduced into
the real-time schedule by REORDER. Hence, we developed
a metric that we named “schedule entropy” (Section IV-A)
that measures the amount of obfuscation for each given real-
time task set/schedule. Hence, schedule entropy can be used
to not just capture the amount of randomness introduced into
the system but also compare different obfuscation schemes.
REORDER is implemented in a (real-time) Linux kernel4.
It was evaluated (Section VI) (a) on a realistic embedded
platform (Raspberry Pi) (b) using an automotive benchmark
suite (MiBench) [26]. In addition, we also carry out a design-
space exploration using synthetic real-time task sets5 (Section
IV-C). This paper makes the following contributions:
● a randomization algorithm that shuffles EDF schedules
(Section III-B),● “schedule entropy” – a new metric to calculate the amount
of randomness in the task schedules (Section IV) and● an implementation of the REORDER algorithm in the
Linux kernel (Section VI).
We first present some background information as well as the
system and adversary models.
II. SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
A. Background
Standard real-time scheduling theory generally considers
periodically executing tasks6 [27], [19], [28] that models
typical real-time control systems. Each task τi generates
a potentially infinite sequence of jobs and is modeled by
the worst-case computation time (WCET) Ci and a defined
minimum inter-arrival time (i.e., period) Ti. Also tasks have
a strict (relative) deadline Di by which a computation must
3In static algorithms, these bounds can easily be computed offline and stored
in lookup tables.
4Please see repository [25] for the source code of our implementation.
5A common practice in the real-time community.
6This trivially maps with the concept of a process in general purpose OS.
be finished. Task priorities can be static or dynamic [19].
The optimal static scheme is the RM priority assignment
where shorter period implies higher priority. RM can guarantee
schedulability of a given set of tasks as long as the total
utilization is below log 2 ≈ 69%. The overall optimal scheme
is EDF – a dynamic-priority algorithm that always picks the
job of a task whose deadline is closest. EDF can schedule
any set of tasks if the total system utilization does not exceed
100% (e.g., sum of the WCET to period ratio for all tasks in
the system is less than unity: ∑
τi
Ci
Ti
< 1).
B. System Model
Let us consider the problem of scheduling a set of n periodic
tasks Γ = {τ1, τ2,⋯, τn} on a single processor7, using the EDF
scheduling policy. For simplicity of notation, we use the same
symbol τi to denote a task’s jobs and use the term task and
job interchangeably. We also denote di as the absolute deadline
of τi (i.e., deadline of any given job of τi). We assume cache
related preemption delay is negligible compared to WCET of
the tasks. We do not consider any precedence or synchroniza-
tion constraints among tasks and Ci, Ti,Di ∈ N+,. We further
assume that the tasks have constrained-deadlines, i.e., Di ≤ Ti
and the taskset is schedulable by the EDF scheduling policy,
that is the worst-case response time (WCRT)8 of each task
is less than its deadline – since REORDER will be trivially
ineffective for an unschedulable taskset.
Under the periodic task model, the schedule produced by
any preemptive scheduling policy, for a periodic taskset, is
cyclic i.e., the system will repeat the task arrival pattern
after an interval that coincides with the taskset’s hyperperiod9
[29], denoted by L. Furthermore, we consider a discrete time
model (e.g., integral time units [30]) where system and task
parameters are multiples of a time unit10.
C. Adversary Model
We assume that the attackers have access to the timing
parameters of the tasksets and also have knowledge of which
scheduling policy is being used. The adversary’s objective is
to get detailed information about the execution patterns of the
real-time tasks and cause greater damage [3], [2], to the system
by exploiting the precise schedule information.
As introduced in Section I, the attacker may exploit some
side-channels (e.g., power consumption, schedule preemptions,
electromagnetic (EM) emanations and temperature) to observe
and reconstruct the system schedule [3]. A smart attacker
possessing sufficient system information can carry out more
advanced attacks under the right conditions, to move the
system to an unsafe state. For example, in the now famous
Stuxnet attack [5], the malware was remnant in the system
for months to collect sensitive information before the main
7Since most RTS are still using single core platforms.
8The calculation of WCRT is presented in Section III-A.
9The hyperperiod of the taskset is the least common multiple (LCM) of the
periods of the tasks.
10We denote an interval starting from time point a and ending at time point
b that has a length of b − a by [a, b) or [a, b − 1].
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attack. It is possible for a denial-of-service attack to target only
a specific service handled by a critical task when the precise
schedule information is obtainable. A side-channel attack [31],
[32] is also another typical class of attacks that can benefit
from such schedule reconstruction attacks. For example, it was
shown that the precise schedule information can be exploited
to assist in determining the prime and probe [33] instants in a
cache side-channel attack to increase the chance of success [2].
We further assume that the scheduler is not compromised
and the attacker does not have access to the scheduler. Without
this assumption, the attacker can undermine the scheduler or
directly obtain the schedule information. Our objective, then, is
to reduce the inferability of the schedule for real-time tasksets
(and also reduce possibility of other attacks that depend of
predictable schedules) while meeting real-time guarantees. The
randomness introduced to the schedule increases variations
in the system and hence makes attacks that rely on the
determinism of the real-time schedule, harder.
III. SCHEDULE RANDOMIZATION PROTOCOL
In this section we describe the REORDER protocol. The
focus of our design is such that, even if an observer is able to
capture the exact schedule for a period of time (for instance,
for a few hyperperiods), REORDER will schedule tasks in
a way that succeeding execution traces will show different
orders (and timing) of execution for the tasks. The main idea
is that at each scheduling point, we pick a random task from
the ready queue and schedule it for execution. However such
random selection may lead to priority inversions [34] and any
arbitrary selection may result in missed deadlines – hence,
putting at risk the safety of the system. REORDER solves this
problem by allowing bounded priority inversions. It restricts
how the schedule may use priority inversions without violating
real-time constraints (e.g., deadline) of the tasks. To ensure
this, REORDER calculates an “acceptable” priority inversion
budget. If the budget is exhausted during execution, then we
stop allowing lower priority tasks to execute ahead of the
higher priority task that has the empty budget. The following
sections present the details of the REORDER protocol.
A. Randomization with Priority Inversion
A key step that is necessary for randomization is to calculate
the maximum amount of time that lower priority jobs, lp(τi),
can execute before τi. This is much harder in EDF compared
to the fixed-priority system (that prior work, TaskShuffler [24],
was focused on) due to the dynamic nature of EDF (i.e., the
task priority varies at run-time). Therefore we define the worst-
case inversion budget (WCIB) Vi that represents the maximum
amount of time for which a job of some task τi with relative
deadline di may be blocked by a job of some task τj ∈ Γ, j ≠ i
with dj > di (and hence lower relative priority than τi). In the
following we illustrate how we calculate WCIB for each task
by utilizing the response time analysis [35], [36] for EDF.
1) Bounding Priority Inversions: The WCRT of τi is the
maximum time between the arrival of a job of τi and its
completion. Our idea of bounding priority inversions is to
calculate the slack times for each task (e.g., difference between
deadline and response time) and allow low priority tasks to
execute up to that amount of time. We therefore define the
WCIB of τi as follows:
Vi =Di −Ri. (1)
where Ri represents an upper bound of WCRT (see Ap-
pendix A for the calculation of Ri). The Vi represents the
maximum amount of time for which all lower priority jobs
lp(τi) (e.g., dj > di) are allowed to execute while an instance
of τi is still unfinished without missing its deadline, even in
the worst-case scenario. The REORDER protocol guarantees
that the real-time constraints are satisfied by bounding priority
inversions using Vi,∀τi ∈ Γ. Note that WCIB can be negative
for some τi – although non-positive WCIB does not attribute
that the taskset is unschedulable. At each scheduling point t,
our idea is to execute some low priority job τj with Vj > 0
up to min(Ĉtj , Vj) additional time-units before it leaves the
processor for highest priority job where Ĉtj represents the
remaining execution time of τj at t.
We enforce the WCIB at run-time by maintaining a per-job
counter, remaining inversion budget (RIB) vi, 0 ≤ vi ≤ Vi.
RIB is initialized to Vi upon each activation of the jobs of
τi and decremented for each time unit when τi is blocked
by any lower priority job. When vi reaches zero no job with
absolute deadline greater than di is allowed to run until τi
completes. Note that not all the jobs of τi may need Ci time
unit for computation (recall that Ci is the worst-case bound of
the execution time). If some low-priority job τj (e.g., dj > di)
that blocks τi finishes earlier than Cj , the RIB vi will not be
decreased accordingly.
For a given non-negative WCIB, jobs of τi can be delayed
for up to Vi by priority inversions. The WCRT of τi is bounded
by Ri +Vi = Ri +Di −Ri =Di. Hence, τi is schedulable with
the REORDER protocol and we can assert the following:
Proposition 1. If Γ is schedulable under EDF, WCIB is non-
negative for some τi and low priority jobs of τi do not delay
τi more than Vi then REORDER will not violate the real-time
constraints of τi.
2) Selection of Candidate Jobs for Randomization: As we
mentioned earlier, when the run-time counter RIB (i.e., vi)
reaches zero, no jobs with deadline greater than di can run
while τi has an outstanding job. However, lower priority jobs
could cause τi to miss its deadline by inducing the worst-case
interference from the higher priority jobs, i.e., ∀dj < di, due to
the chain reaction. Therefore, to preserve the schedulability of
such jobs we must prevent it from experiencing such additional
delays. We achieve this by the following inversion policy:▸ Randomization Priority Inversion Policy (RPIP): If RIB
vi < 0 for some τi ∈ Γ, no job τj with dj > di is allowed
to run while any of high priority job τk with dk < di has an
unfinished job.
In order to enforce RPIP at run-time, at each scheduling
decision point, we now define the variable minimum inversion
deadline mti for jobs of τi as follows: m
t
i = min{dj ∣τj ∈
3
RtQ, dj > di ∧ vj < 0}. where RtQ is the ready queue at
scheduling point t. When there is no such task as τj , mti is
set to an arbitrarily large (e.g., infinite) deadline. The variable
mti allows us to determine which jobs to exclude from priority
inversions. That is, no job that has a higher deadline than
mti can be scheduled as long as τi has an unfinished job.
Otherwise, the job with relative deadline mti (not the job τi)
could miss its deadline.
Example 1. The taskset Γex1 = {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4} contains the
following parameters:
Task Ci Ti = Di Vi
τ1 4 10 1
τ2 1 20 −2
τ3 1 5 −2
τ4 2 12 −1
At t = 0, d1 = 10, d2 = 20, d3 = 5, d4 = 12. For notational
convenience, let us denote m0i as mi. Hence m1 = 12, m2 =∞,
m3 = 12 and m4 = 20. Therefore at t = 0 the job τ2 and
τ4 are not allowed to participate in priority inversion (since
d2, d4 >mi, i ∈ {1,3} and τ1, τ3 have not completed.
It can be shown that at any scheduling point t we can
enforce RPIP by only examining the inversion deadline of
highest priority (e.g., shortest deadline) job, mtHP [24]. Hence,
at each scheduling decision, REORDER excludes all ready jobs
from the selection that have higher deadline than mtHP .
B. Overview of The Randomization Protocol
The REORDER protocol selects a new job using the fol-
lowing sequence of steps (refer to Algorithm 1 for a formal
description) at every scheduling decision point.● Step 1 (Candidate Selection): At each scheduling point t,
the REORDER protocol searches for possible candidate
jobs (that can be used for priority inversion) in the ready
queue. Let us denote RtQ as the set of ready jobs, τHP ∈RtQ is the highest priority (i.e., shortest deadline) job in
the ready queue and CtL represents the set of candidate
jobs at some scheduling point t.
– We first check the RIB of the highest priority job
τHP ∈ RtQ. If the RIB is zero, then τHP is added
to the candidate and REORDER moves to Step 2 since
priority inversion is not possible due to its inversion
budget being non-positive.
– When RIB is non-negative (i.e., vHP > 0), we iterate
through the ready queue and add the job τi ∈ RtQ to
the candidate list CtL if its deadline is less than or equal
to mtHP (i.e., the minimum inversion deadline of the
highest-priority job at scheduling point t).● Step 2 (Randomizing the Schedule): This step selects a
random job from the ready queue for execution. The
selected job will run until the next scheduling decision
point t′. We randomly pick a job τR from CtL and set the
next scheduling decision point as follows:
– If τR is the highest priority job in the ready queue,
the next decision point t′ will be either when the job
finishes or a new job of another task arrives.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
3 3 1 2 2 3 3 0 0 0 3 3 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 0
2 2 3 3 1 3 3 0 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 3 3 0 0 0
Schedule 
(Vanilla)
Schedule 
(Randomized)
Time
Fig. 2: An instance of schedule randomization protocol for the taskset
presented in Example 2. The length of the taskset hyperperiod is
L = 20 and 0 represents idle time (e.g., when no other tasks are
active). The upward and downward arrows represent job activations
and deadlines, respectively.
– Otherwise, the next decision11 will be made at when
τR completes or the inversion budget expires, that is,
t′ = t +min(ĈtR, v̂), (2)
unless a new job arrives before time t′ where v̂ =
min(vj ∣τj ∈ RtQ ∧ dj < dR) and ĈtR represents the
remaining execution time of τR. Note that the variable
v̂ is always positive since every job with a higher
priority than the selected job has some remaining
inversion budget. Otherwise, τR would not have been
added to the candidate list in Step 1.
We now use a simple example to illustrate our randomiza-
tion protocol.
Example 2. Let us consider the taskset Γex2 = {τ1, τ2, τ3}
with following parameters:
Task Ci Ti = Di Vi
τ1 1 10 3
τ2 2 20 5
τ3 2 5 3
The taskset is schedulable by EDF (e.g., ∑
τi∈Γex2 CiTi ≤ 1). The
schedule of the vanilla EDF and an instance of randomization
protocol is illustrated in Fig. 2. At time t = 0, all three jobs
are in ready queue and have positive inversion budget. Notice
that τ3 is the highest priority job, mHP = ∞ and all three
jobs are in the candidate list. Let the scheduler randomly pick
τ2 . From Eq. (2), the next scheduling decision will be taken
at t = 0 + min(2,3) = 2. At t = 2, v1 = v3 = 1, mHP =
m3 = ∞ and both τ1 and τ3 are in candidate list. Let τ3
be randomly scheduled (that is also the highest priority job).
The next scheduling decision will be at t = 2 + 2 = 4. At
t = 4, only τ1 is active and scheduled (next scheduling decision
will be at t = 5). τ3 is the only active job at time t = 5
and hence scheduled. At t = 10, both τ1 and τ3 are active,
m3 = mHP = ∞ and hence both are in candidate list. τ1 is
randomly scheduled and the next scheduling point will be at
t = 10 + 1 = 11. At t = 11, only τ3 is active and scheduled.
Likewise, τ3 is the only active job at t = 15 and scheduled.
C. Unused Time Reclamation
As mentioned earlier, not all the jobs of a task may require
worst-case unit of time for its computation. We propose to
11Section III-E presents another approach to trigger scheduling decisions.
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reclaim this unused time (e.g., difference between WCET and
actual execution time) to increase the inversion budget for
lower priority jobs. In the case that the (randomly) selected job
finishes earlier (i.e., the actual execution time is smaller than
its WCET), the unused time that is reserved for this job can
be transferred to its lower priority jobs (i.e., those ready jobs
that have higher deadlines at the moment) as extra inversion
budget. Therefore, when enabling this feature, the RIBs of
the lower priority jobs are updated (at the scheduling point
t′ when the selected job τR finishes its execution) as follows:
vj = vj+δt′R, τj ∈Rt′Q∧dj > dR where δt′R represents the unused
time over WCET and Rt′Q is the ready queue at time t′. Note
that the real-time constraints (i.e., deadlines) are respected
since Eq. 1 for every ready job at time t′ still holds (i.e.,
Vj + δt′R =Dj − (Rj − δt′R)) with the unused time transferring.
When there are no tasks in the ready queue (e.g., during
slack time), the processor is idle, e.g., nothing is executing in
the system. Although REORDER brings variations between the
hyperperiods when compared to the vanilla EDF, randomizing
only real-time tasks results in the schedule being somewhat
predictable since the idle times (i.e., slack) appear in nearly
same slots. We address this problem by scrambling the idle
times along with the real-time tasks in the next section.
D. Idle Time Scheduling
One of the limitations of randomizing only the tasks is that
the task execution is squeezed between the idle time slots
and the latter remain predictable. The work-conserving nature
of EDF causes separations between task executions and idle
times. Hence some tasks appear at similar places over multiple
hyperperiods. One way to address this problem and improve
schedule randomness is to idle the processor, intentionally, at
random times [24]. We achieve this by considering idle times
as instances of an additional task, referred to as the idle task,
τI . Then, the randomization protocol can be applied over the
augmented taskset Γ′ = Γ ∪ {τI}.
It can be noted that τI has infinite period, deadline and
execution time, and hence always executes with the lowest
priority. Hence τI can force all other tasks τi ∈ Γ to maximally
consume their inversion budgets. During randomization the
idle task will convert a work-conserving schedule to a non-
work-conserving one, but it will not cause any starvation for
other tasks. This is because Step 2 of the REORDER protocol
(see Section III-B) selects candidate tasks in a way that real-
time constraints for all tasks in the system will always be
respected. Randomizing the idle task effectively makes tasks
appear across wider ranges and thus reduces predictability. As
a result, the schedule can be less susceptible to attacks that
depend on the predictability of RTS.
E. Fine-Grained Switching
In prior work [24] researchers proposed to decrease the
inferability of the fixed-priority scheduler by randomly yield-
ing a job, early, during execution. As a result the schedule
will be fragmented at different time-points and thus will
bring more variations across execution windows. Our proposed
Algorithm 1 Schedule Randomization Protocol
Input: Augmented task set Γ′ = Γ ∪ {τI} and current scheduling point t
Output: The randomized schedule St and the next scheduling point t′
1: RtQ ∶= set of ready jobs
2: Add the highest priority job to the candidate list, i.e., CtL ∶= {RHPQ }
3: /* Search candidate jobs if the highest priority job has non-zero inversion
budget */
4: if vHP > 0 then
5: for each τj ∈RtQ do
6: if dj ≤mtHP then
7: RtQ ∶=RtQ ∪ {τj} /* add τj to candidate list */
8: end if
9: end for
10: end if
11: if CtL = {RHPQ } then
12: /* schedule the highest priority (shortest deadline) job */
13: St ∶=RHPQ
14: Set next scheduling point t′ ∶= when new job arrives or current job
completes
15: else
16: /* randomly select a job τR from CtL */
17: St ∶= τR
18: if τR =RHPQ then
19: Set next scheduling point t′ ∶= when new job arrives or current
job completes
20: else
21: /* set the next random scheduling point t′ as a function of current
job completion or budget expiration time (unless a new job arrives
before t′) */
22: ∆t ∶= rand(1,min(ĈtR, v̂))
23: Set next scheduling point t′ ∶= t +∆t
24: end if
25: end if
26: /* return the scheduled job and the next scheduling point */
27: return (St, t′)
REORDER protocol can also be modified to incorporate such a
feature. Recall that the scheduling decisions in our scheme are
made either when: (i) a new job arrives, (ii) a job completes,
or (iii) the inversion budget expires (refer to Step 2 in Section
III-B). Therefore we can achieve fine-grained switching by
modifying the next scheduling decision point t′ in Eq. (2)
as follows: t′ = t + rand(1,min(ĈtR, v̂)) where the function
rand(a, b) outputs a random number between [a, b].
F. Algorithm
Algorithm 1 formally presents the proposed schedule ran-
domization protocol. This event-driven algorithm executes at
the scheduler-level and takes the taskset (with idle time)
Γ′ = Γ ∪ {τI} as an input. At each scheduling decision point
t, a ready job is (randomly) selected for scheduling and the
next scheduling decision point t′ is determined.
In Lines 3-10, the algorithm first selects the set of candidate
jobs CtL using the procedure described in Section III-B (see
Step 1). If the highest priority job RHPQ has negative inversion
budget (e.g., vHP ≤ 0), it will be scheduled for execution (Line
13). Otherwise it schedules a random job from the candidate
list (Line 17). If the selected job is the highest priority job, the
next scheduling point t′ is set when the job completes or a new
job of another task arrives (Line 14 and 19). If the selected job
is not the highest priority one, the algorithm selects t′ when
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the current inversion budget expires, unless the job completes
or a new job arrives before t′ (Line 23).
The algorithm iterates over the jobs in the current ready
queue RtQ once and makes a single draw from the candidate
list CtL ⊆ RtQ. Assuming a single draw from a uniform
distribution (Line 17 and 22) takes no more than O(∣RtQ∣), the
complexity12 of each instance of the algorithm is O(∣RtQ∣) .
IV. SCHEDULE ENTROPY: A MEASURE OF RANDOMNESS
While the mechanisms presented in Algorithm 1 obfuscates
the inherent determinism in conventional dynamic-priority
schedules, we still need to quantify the randomness that has
been introduced into the schedule. This can be addressed by
analyzing the schedule entropy that measures the randomness
(or unpredictability) in the real-time schedule. Since prior
entropy calculations do not capture the randomness of a
schedule correctly (refer to Appendix B for details) we now
introduce a better approach to measure the schedule entropy.
A. Entropy of a REORDER Schedule
The proposed concept is based on a statistical model
– approximate entropy (ApEn) [37] that is used to eval-
uate the amount of regularity in time series data. Let
us consider K > 1 hyperperiods for a taskset Γ (with
hyperperiod-length L) that is represented as K vectors of
length L as follows: [s10,⋯, s1L−1],⋯, [sK0 ,⋯, sKL−1]. Each
vector includes L intervals of length m of the form
X = [stmod L, s(t+1)mod L,⋯, s(t+m−1)mod L], 0 ≤ t ≤
L − 1 and hence, we have total λ = KL number
of intervals of length m. Let us consider Xkt (m) =[sktmod L, sk(t+1)mod L,⋯, sk(t+m−1)mod L] as the interval of
size m starting from skt on the k-th hyperperiod where
0 ≤ t ≤ L − 1 and 1 ≤ k ≤ K. For all inter-
vals X(k)t (m), let us define the following variable: Ckt ∶=
1
K
∣{k′ ∶ δ(Xkt (m),Xk′t (m)) ≤ pi, 1 ≤ k′ ≤K}∣ , where δ(⋅, ⋅)
denotes the dissimilarity between two intervals of different
hyperperiod, pi is a given dissimilarity threshold and ∣ ⋅ ∣
represents the set cardinality. We use Hamming distance [38]
to evaluate the dissimilarity between intervals – since this
a relatively simple and widely used dissimilarity measure.
For two vectors U = [ui]1≤i≤m and V = [vi]1≤i≤m of size
m, Hamming distance is calculated as follows: δ(U,V ) =
m∑
i=1 I(ui ≠ vi), where I(⋅) is the indicator function that equals
1 if the condition (⋅) is satisfied or 0 otherwise. Notice that,
Ckt represents the number of intervals of length m starting
from sk
′
t , 1 ≤ k′ ≤K with dissimilarity (in terms of Hamming
distance) less than or equal to r from Xkt (m) and normalized
by the number of observed hyperperiods (i.e., K).
Let us now define the variable ηt as an estimation of the
entropy of variable Xkt (m), i.e., an estimation of the entropy
of a vector that starts from slot t with length m as follows:
ηt = − 1K K∑
k=1 log2Ckt . Therefore for a given interval length
1 ≤ m ≤ L and dissimilarity threshold pi, the randomness
12Section VI-2 presents empirical evaluations for scheduling overhead.
(entropy) of a schedule observed over K hyperperiods is given
by the following equation: Ĥ(Sk,m,pi,K) = 1
m
L−1∑
t=0 ηt. Notice
that, for a deterministic scheduler (e.g., when all the jobs of
the tasks take WCET for computation for vanilla EDF) the
schedule entropy Ĥ(Sk,m,pi,K) will be equal to zero (i.e.,
there is no randomness, as expected).
B. Interpretation of Entropy
The schedule entropy depicts the randomness for a given
schedule. When comparing the entropies of two schedule
sequences with equal lengths, a higher value implies that
more variations are introduced in each time slot and the
chance for a task appearing at the same time slot in every
hyperperiod is smaller. Consider the taskset presented in
Example 1 as an example – the schedule entropies are 6.12
and 9.49 when scheduled by vanilla EDF and REORDER,
respectively. As we can see from the frequency spectrum of
the two schedule sequences (Fig. 1), the higher randomness
reduces the determinism in the schedule and some periods
become unidentifiable from the spectral analysis.
Other methods, such as side-channel attacks, also suffer
since the victim tasks can potentially appear in larger ranges
of executions. Such attacks typically require “prepping” (e.g.,
prime and probe [33]) of the system and the closer this is
done to the actual execution of the victim task, the better
it is for the adversary. With increasing entropy values, the
attacker has lesser precision in narrowing the exact arrival
times for the victim task(s) and hence, experiences more noise
in measurements. Similarly, covert channels [39] will also
suffer since the expected execution order of tasks is broken
due to the randomization – hence, higher entropy values result
in larger variations from the “expected” covert channel.
C. Evaluation of Schedule Entropy
We now evaluate the REORDER protocol with synthetic
workloads. This is to understand the degree of randomness
introduced into the schedule and we use the schedule entropy
calculations from Section IV-A. The evaluation of scheduling
overhead on a real platform is presented in Section VI.
1) Simulation Setup: We used the parameters similar to
that in earlier research [8], [24], [40], [41]. The tasksets
were grouped into base-utilization buckets (e.g., total sum of
the task utilizations) from [0.01 + 0.1 ⋅ i,0.1 + 0.1 ⋅ i] where
i ∈ Z ∧ 0 ≤ i < 9. Each base-utilization group contained
250 tasksets and each of which had [3,10] tasks. We only
considered tasksets that were schedulable by EDF.
For a given base-utilization bucket, the utilization Ui of
individual tasks were generated from a uniform distribution
using the UUniFast [42] algorithm. The period of each task
was greater than 10 with a divisor of 100. This allowed us
to set a common hyperperiod (e.g., L = 100) for all the
tasksets. We assumed that the deadlines are implicit, e.g.,
Di = Ti, ∀τi. The execution time Ci for each of the tasks
in the taskset was computed using the generated period and
utilization: Ci = ⌈UiTi⌉. The execution time of each job of τi
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Fig. 3: The average entropy of the system with varying total utiliza-
tion for different randomization schemes. The REORDER schedule
shows maximum randomness (e.g., entropy) in the low-to-medium
base-utilization (e.g., < 0.7).
was randomly selected from ⌈α ⋅Ci⌉ where α = [0.5,1]. The
interval window size was m = ⌈0.35L⌉ and the dissimilarity
threshold pi, 0.1L (Appendix C). For each schedulable taskset,
we observed the schedule for K = 100 hyperperiods.
2) Results: We now evaluate how much randomness
(viz., unpredictability) the REORDER protocol incurs w.r.t.
vanilla EDF using the following schemes:
● REORDER (Base): only tasks are randomized;● REORDER (IT): randomization with augmented tasksets
(e.g., including idle time randomization);● REORDER (FT): fine-grained switching for augmented
taskset (e.g., yielding tasks at random points); and● REORDER (UTR): randomization with fine-grain
scheduling and unused time reclamation.
In these experiments we focus on observing the average
behavior of randomization schemes. In Fig. 3 we present the
average schedule entropy of vanilla EDF (e.g., no randomiza-
tion) along with different randomization schemes.
The X-axis of Fig. 3 shows the total system utilization. The
Y-axis represents mean schedule entropy (normalized to 1),
e.g., Ĥmean(⋅) = 1nˆs nˆs∑i=1 Ĥi(⋅), where nˆs represents the number
of schedulable tasksets for a given base-utilization group and
Ĥi(⋅) is the entropy of taskset i. For higher utilizations entropy
for vanilla EDF increases since the schedule across multiple
hyperperiods becomes different because of less slack (e.g.,
idle times). As we can see from this figure, the randomization
protocol significantly increases schedule entropy. The idle time
randomization with fine-grained scheduling and unused time
reclamation (e.g., REORDER (UTR)) significantly improves
the entropy over base randomization. Note that for higher
utilization the improvement is marginal. This is due the fact
that for higher utilization, the system does not have enough
slack (e.g., idle times) to randomize much – and hence all three
schemes show similar results (in terms of schedule entropy).
As the utilization increases (e.g., lesser slack), there are very
few candidate jobs for priority inversions because of higher
load. Hence, the entropy (i.e., randomness) drops – albeit the
schedule is still less predictable compared to the vanilla EDF
(since the mean entropy is greater than entropy of EDF).
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Fig. 4: The geometric mean of the execution range to the deadline
ratio. For REORDER the mean ratio is higher when utilization is
greater than 0.4 – that implies the tasks appear in wider ranges and
hence it is harder to infer the actual execution time.
Another way to observe the schedule randomness is to
measure the ranges within which each task can appear. A wider
range implies that is is harder to predict when a task executes.
In this experiment we measured the first and the last time slots
where a job of each task τi appears and used the difference
between them as the range of execution for τi (denoted as wi).
In Fig. 4 we show the ratio of execution range to deadline
(e.g., wi
Di
≤ 1) of the tasks. The X-axis of the figure shows
total utilization and Y-axis represents the geometric mean of
the task execution range to deadline ratios in each taskset.
For low utilization situations, tasks appear within narrow
ranges because of the work-conserving nature of the EDF
algorithm. With increasing utilization the ranges become
wider. This is because the worst-case response times of tasks
(particularly, for lower priority tasks) increases due to the
higher loads. For lower utilization, the system is dominated
by slack times and hence randomizing tasks do not improve
the execution range compared to vanilla EDF. This is because
some (low-priority) jobs finish earlier due to priority inversions
and hence the response time of those jobs is actually lower
than the EDF scheme. As a result mean ratio for REORDER
decreases. As the figure shows, for higher utilization (e.g.,
utilization greater than 0.4) tasks appear in wider ranges (e.g.,
higher mean ratio) when REORDER is enabled. This is due
to the fact that priority inversions with REORDER (FT/UTR)
increase task response times (especially for higher priority
tasks). Besides, inverting the priority can also move lower
priority jobs closer to their release times, thus widening the
execution range. Since the tasks with REORDER appear in
wider ranges this also prevents an attacker from triggering
side channel attacks as we mentioned in Section IV-B.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We implemented REORDER in a real-time Linux kernel
running on a realistic embedded platform to validate its usabil-
ity and to evaluate its overhead. To this end we also measure
the overheads by comparing this to an existing vanilla EDF
scheduler. In this section we provide platform information
and a high level overview of the implementation. We have
open-sourced our implementation and make it available on an
anonymized public repository [25]. The platform information
and configurations are summarized in Table I.
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Table I: Summary of the Implementation Platform
Artifact Parameters
Platform ARM Cortex-A53 (Raspberry Pi 3)
System Configuration 1.2 GHz 64-bit processor, 1 GB RAM
Operating System Debian Linux (Raspbian)
Kernel Version Linux Kernel 4.9.48
Real-time Patch PREEMPT_RT 4.9.47-rt37
Kernel Configuration
(make defconfig)
CONFIG_SMP disabled
CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL enabled
Boot Commands maxcpus=1
Run-time Variables sched_rt_runtime_us=−1
scaling_governor=performance
MiBench Applications Security: sha,blowfish
Consumer: typeset
Automotive: basicmath,bitcount,
qsort,susan
A. Platform and Operating System
We used a Raspberry Pi 3 (RPi3) Model B13 development
board as the base platform for our implementation. The RPi3 is
equipped with a 1.2 GHz 64-bit quad-core ARM Cortex-A53
CPU developed on top of Broadcom BCM2837 SoC (System-
on-Chip). RPi3 runs on a vendor-supported open-source oper-
ating system, Raspbian (a variant of Debian Linux). We forked
the Raspbian kernel and modified it (refer to the following
sections) to implement the REORDER protocol. Since we
focus on the single core EDF scheduler in this paper, the multi-
core functionality of RPi3 was deactivated by disabling the
CONFIG_SMP flag during the Linux kernel compilation phase.
The boot command file was also set with maxcpus = 1 to
further ensure the single core usage.
B. Real-time Environment
The mainline Linux kernel does not provide any hard
real-time guarantees even with the custom scheduling poli-
cies (e.g., SCHED_FIFO, SCHED_RR). However the Real-Time
Linux (RTL) Collaborative Project [43] maintains a kernel
(based on the mainline Linux kernel) for real-time pur-
poses. This patched kernel (known as the PREEMPT_RT)
ensures real-time behavior by making the scheduler fully
preemptable. In this paper, we applied the PREEMPT_RT
patch on top of vanilla Raspbian (kernel version 4.9.48)
to enable the real-time functionality. To further enable the
fully preemptive functionality from the PREEMPT_RT patch,
the CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT_FULL flag was enabled during the
kernel compilation phase. Furthermore, the system variable
/proc/sys/kernel/sched_rt_runtime_us was set to −1
to disable the throttling of the real-time scheduler. This
setting allowed the real-time tasks to use up the entire
100% CPU utilization if required14. Also, the active core’s
scaling_governor was set to “performance” mode to dis-
able dynamic frequency scaling during the experiments.
C. Vanilla EDF Scheduler
Since Linux kernel version 3.14, an EDF implementation
(SCHED_DEADLINE) is available in the kernel[22]. Since our
13https://www.raspberrypi.org/products/raspberry-pi-3-model-b/.
14This change in system variable settings was mainly configured for the
purpose of experimenting with the ideas of REORDER only. For most real
use-cases, users can keep this system variable untouched for more flexibility.
PREEMPT_RT patched kernel supports SCHED_DEADLINE, we
used this as the baseline EDF implementation and extended
the scheduler to implement the REORDER protocol.
In Linux the system call sched_setattr() is invoked
to configure the scheduling policy for a given process15.
By design, SCHED_DEADLINE has the highest priority among
all the supported scheduling policies (e.g., SCHED_NORMAL,
SCHED_FIFO and SCHED_RR). It’s also worth noting that
the Linux kernel maintains a separate run queue for
SCHED_DEADLINE (i.e., struct dl_rq). Therefore, it is possi-
ble to extend SCHED_DEADLINE while keeping other schedul-
ing policies untouched. Note that this vanilla EDF scheduler
is also used as a base for comparison with the REORDER
protocol. The experimental results are presented in Section VI.
D. Implementation of REORDER
1) Task/Job-specific Variables: The Linux kernel de-
fines a structure, struct sched_dl_entity, dedicated to
SCHED_DEADLINE, to store task and job-related variables (both
run-time and static variables). They include typical EDF task
parameters (e.g., period, deadline and WCET).
To implement REORDER we added two additional vari-
ables, named reorder_wcib and reorder_rib, both s64
(signed 64 bit integer) type variables, to store the WCIB for the
task and to track the RIB for the task’s active job at any given
moment, respectively. Each task’s reorder_wcib is initialized
and updated when a new task is created. The job-specific run-
time variable, reorder_rib, is initialized to the precomputed
reorder_wcib every time when a new job arrives. During
run-time, the inversion budget was updated (i.e., decreased
by the elapsed time in the case of priority inversion) along
with other SCHED_DEADLINE run-time variables in the function
update_curr_dl(). It is used to determine whether the
inversion budget was consumed and a random selection of
a job was allowed at a scheduling point.
In our implementations we did not use any external libraries
and only used the built-in kernel functions. The following
listing shows a part of the existing variables as well as the
newly added ones (the highlighted lines). Other variables
added for the REORDER protocol are shown in Appendix D.
struct sched_dl_entity {
/⁎ task specific parameters ⁎/
u64 dl_runtime; // WCET
u64 dl_deadline; // relative deadline
u64 dl_period; // period
s64 reorder_wcib; // worst -case inversion budget
/⁎ task instance (job) specific parameters ⁎/
s64 runtime; // remaining runtime
u64 deadline; // absolute deadline
s64 reorder_rib; // remaining inversion budget
....
/⁎ Other variables are omitted for readability. ⁎/
};
15Since there is no distinction between processes and threads in the Linux
kernel’s scheduler, for the simplicity of the illustration, we use the term
process, thread and task interchangeably in the following context.
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2) Task Selection Function: The REORDER
protocol was implemented as a function, named
pick_rad_next_dl_entity(), that selects a task and
sets the next scheduling point based on the REORDER
algorithm. It replaces the original SCHED_DEADLINE function,
pick_next_dl_entity() (i.e., one that picks the task
that has the next absolute deadline from the run queue,
viz., the leftmost node in the scheduler’s red-black tree). This
function is indirectly called by the main scheduler function
__schedule() when the next task for execution is needed.
3) Randomization Function: We used the built-in random
number generator in the kernel. It supports the system call
get_random_bytes() defined in linux/random.h. It is used
by the function pick_rad_next_dl_entity() to select a
random task and a random execution interval for the next
scheduling point as explained in Algorithm 1.
4) Schedule Timer: A high-resolution timer (i.e.,
struct hrtimer) was used to trigger the additional
scheduling points introduced by the REORDER protocol,
as described in Algorithm 1 (Line 22 and 23). Since this
timer is a scheduler-specific timer, it is stored in dl_rq, as
reorder_pi_timer. It is worth noting that hrtimer is also
used by SCHED_DEADLINE to enforce the task periods.
5) Idle Time Scheduling: As introduced in Section III-D,
idle times are considered when the idle time scheduling
scheme is deployed. In our Linux kernel implementation, we
utilized the native idle task maintained under the SCHED_IDLE
scheduler for this purpose. The REORDER protocol yields
its scheduling opportunities (to other schedulers such as
SCHED_IDLE) if τI , the idle task in the REORDER protocol,
is selected and running. The subsequent scheduling point is
enforced by reorder_pi_timer.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate REORDER using a prototype
implemented on an embedded platform (i.e., RPi3) running
the real-time Linux kernel. We mainly focus on overheads
for computing and selecting a task at each scheduling point.
Recall that our implementation is based on the vanilla EDF
scheduler, SCHED_DEADLINE, on Linux. Therefore, we eval-
uate the overheads of the REORDER protocol by comparing
them with SCHED_DEADLINE. The key observations from our
performance evaluation results are summarized below.
● REORDER works in practice on realistic embedded RTS
and is able to meet the real-time guarantees.● The randomization logic adds minimal scheduling over-
head in Linux kernel (Fig. 5). This overhead is arguably
very small w.r.t. the task execution time (Fig. 6).
1) Experimental Setup: We use the RPi3 platform as in-
troduced in Section V. The operating system is patched and
configured to enable the real-time capability, as shown in
Table I. To keep the vanilla EDF unpolluted from our imple-
mentation, we used two separately compiled kernels during
the experiments. In the vanilla EDF kernel, the scheduling
functions remained untouched. Only the necessary code to
benchmark the overhead were added. Note that PREEMPT_RT
real-time patch was still applied on this kernel.
We used a mixture of MiBench benchmark automotive pro-
grams [26] and synthetically generated tasks. The goal of the
experiments was to evaluate the performance on both real and
synthetic workloads on a real platform. A total of 800 tasksets
were tested. Each taskset was configured with the number of
tasks from 1 to 10 (10 groups) and 50% of the tasks are drawn
from the MiBench programs (Table I). The utilization was set
between the ranges 10% and 90% (8 utilization groups, 10
tasksets per group) when generating the tasksets. Each task’s
period was randomly selected from the range 10 ms and 5000
ms. Taskset parameters were randomly generated using the
taskset generator from the simulation (see Section IV-C1). The
generated parameters (e.g., the task’s period and WCET) were
multiples of 1ms. In the experiments, the actual execution time
performed by a synthetic task τi was limited to ⌊0.8 ⋅Ci⌋ (i.e.,
80% of its WCET) to accommodate realistic task execution
behaviors. Both, vanilla EDF and REORDER-based schedulers
were tested with the same tasksets.
To profile the number of context switches, we directly
recorded their occurrence in the scheduler. We did not use
external profiling tools (e.g., perf [44]) because we only focus
on the context switches that occur in the SCHED_DEADLINE
scheduler (for both the vanilla EDF and the randomized EDF).
Using the profiling tool may include unnecessary context
switch counts from other coexisting Linux schedulers. To mea-
sure the execution time of the scheduling functions, the func-
tion getnstimeofday(), defined in linux/timekeeping.h,
was used. For the experiments, we let each taskset run for
5 seconds. The measurements and the scheduling trace were
stored in the kernel log for further analysis.
2) Results: We first examine the execution time overhead
of the scheduling functions. As mentioned in Section V-D2,
the main algorithm for the REORDER protocol was imple-
mented in the function pick_rad_next_dl_entity(). This
replaces the scheduling function pick_next_dl_entity() in
SCHED_DEADLINE (vanilla EDF). As this was the main change
between the two schedulers, our test here was focused on
measuring the execution time of pick_next_dl_entity()
(for vanilla EDF) and pick_rad_next_dl_entity() (for
REORDER) rather than the higher level scheduler function.
Fig. 5 shows the results of this experiment.
From the figure, we can observe that the mean execution
cost of pick_next_dl_entity() for the vanilla EDF re-
mains about the same across different taskset groups. This
result is expected because the vanilla EDF always selects
the leftmost node from the Linux red-black tree (i.e., run
queue) that is independent to the number of tasks in a
taskset and has complexity O(1). On the other hand, the
mean execution cost of pick_rad_next_dl_entity() for
the base randomization (without idle time randomization) is
generally larger than the vanilla EDF mainly due to the
get_random_bytes() calls (that takes an average 2531 ns
to generate a 64-bit random number) for the random task
selections. When there is only one job in the run queue at
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Fig. 5: The execution time cost (in nanoseconds) for the scheduling
functions of the vanilla EDF and the randomized EDF. The vanilla
EDF bar represents the mean execution times processed by the
function pick_next_dl_entity() while the other three EDF bars
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that carries out the randomization algorithm.
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Fig. 6: The proportion of the cost of the REORDER protocol to
the task execution times in the fine-grained switching with idle
time randomization scheme. The randomization protocol overhead is
provably inversely proportional to the taskset’s total utilization. The
upper part of the figure is scaled to 99%−100% for better readability.
a scheduling point, the base randomization scheme directly
selects the job and omits the get_random_bytes() call. In
the case of the idle time scheduling, REORDER (IT), since
the idle task is always considered in every scheduling point,
the algorithm reaches the final step with a randomly selected
task most of the time. This leads to the overhead roughly
corresponding to one get_random_bytes() call. For the
fine-grained switching with idle time randomization scheme
and unused time reclamation (i.e., REORDER (FG/UTR)),
the overhead remains at a higher level since, in the worst
case, two get_random_bytes() calls are present for each
scheduling point: one for the random task selection and the
other for the random scheduling points. This results in the
scheduling overhead corresponding to the execution cost of
two get_random_bytes() calls. As a result, the overhead
contributed by the other part of the algorithm that has com-
plexity O(∣RtQ∣) (as discussed in Section III-F) is negligible
compared to the randomization function.
Next we examine the proportion of the scheduling overhead
to the task’s execution. We do this by comparing the cumula-
tive time cost of the randomization protocol with the cumula-
tive task execution times during the 5 second test duration for
each taskset. Here, we consider the fine-grained switching with
idle time randomization and unused time reclamation scheme
(REORDER (UTR)) as it has the largest overhead among all
possible schemes. Fig. 6 shows the mean proportion of the
cost of the REORDER (UTR) protocol to the task execution
times with varying total utilization. The results indicate that the
overhead of the REORDER protocol is inversely proportional
to the taskset’s total utilization. Since a taskset with higher
utilization spends more of its time executing actual RT jobs,
it dilutes the influence from the overhead. The utilization
group [0.8,0.9] has an average of 0.12% overhead while it is
0.54% for the [0.1,0.2] utilization group. Considering there
is typically an overestimation in the range 5% and 15% for
task WCET calculations [45], the overhead of the REORDER
protocol is negligible for most RTS.
VII. DISCUSSION
Although we only focused on the fact that REORDER
can reduce the predictability of conventional dynamic priority
scheduler, this idea improves the security posture of future
RTS in a more fundamental way. For any scheduling policy,
one can infer the amount of information leaked from the
system. This information, for instance, will be useful for the
engineers to analyze the potential vulnerability (associated
with timing inference attacks) of the given system.
Consider a schedule S that is output from the randomization
protocol (referred to as ground-truth process) and let S ′ be
the attackers (potentially semi-correct) observation about the
schedule (noted as observation). We can define the information
leakage as the amount of uncertainty (of the adversary) as fol-
lows: the uncertainty about the ground-truth process minus the
attackers uncertainty (about the true schedule) after receiving
the (fuzzy) observation (i.e., the amount of the reduction of
uncertainty due to receiving the observation). One can then
use mutual information [46, Ch. 2] (e.g., sup
u˜
I(S;S ′) where
u˜ is the possible decoding strategies that an adversary can use
and I(S;S ′) = H(S) −H(S ∣S ′) is the mutual information)
between the ground-truth and the observation as a measure of
leakage. A high dependency between the ground-truth and the
observation leads to a high information leakage. This implies
that the adversary can have a good estimation of the ground-
truth. The frameworks developed in this work aims to increase
the randomness of the output of the scheduler and reduce the
dependency between S and the S ′. This is because, for the
randomized scheduler, there are more true schedules that are
consistent with a given observation. We highlight that defining
the exact relationship between the produced randomness and
the leakage of the system will require further study. We intend
to explore this aspect in future work.
While REORDER reduces the chances of the success of
timing inference attacks (and hence improves the security),
it is not free from trade-offs. For instance, as we observe in
Fig. 5 and 6, the randomization logic adds extra overheads to
the scheduler. In this work we did not attempt to derive any
analytic upper-bound on the number of context switches and
leave this for future work.
Note that it may be possible that some (heavily utilized)
tasksets can not be randomized and in that case both EDF
and REORDER output the same schedule. For instance, let us
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consider the taskset Γex3 = {τ1, τ2, τ3, τ4} with the following
parameters: C1 = 1,C2 = 3,C3 = 2,C4 = 4 and T1 = 5, T2 =
8, T3 = 9, T4 = 20 (with Ti = Di,1 ≤ i ≤ 4). The taskset is
schedulable by EDF since ∑
1≤i≤4 CiTi = 0.997 < 1. However,
in this case the budgets (e.g., WCIB) are always negative
for all the tasks, e.g., V1 = −2, V2 = −1, V3 = −4, V4 = −4.
Therefore, at each scheduling point all the low-priority jobs
will be excluded from priority inversion and only the shortest
deadline job will be selected – i.e., the same schedule as EDF.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Krüger et al. [23] proposed a combined online/offline
randomization scheme to reduce determinisms for time-
triggered (TT) systems where tasks are executed based on
a pre-computed, offline, slot-based schedule. The schedul-
ing paradigms for TT systems are different than dynamic
priority RTS. The closest line of work is TaskShuffler [24]
where authors proposed to randomize task schedules for fixed-
priority (e.g., RM) systems. However the methods developed
in both of the above are not directly applicable for dynamic
priority systems. Unlike fixed priority systems, obfuscating
schedules for EDF scheduling is not straightforward due to
run-time changes to task priorities. Besides, as we describe in
Appendix B, the calculation of schedule entropy in prior work
does not correctly capture the randomness for all scenarios.
Prior work also assumes all the jobs of the tasks always
execute with WCET and hence may not be practical for real
applications.
Zimmer et al. [47] propose the mechanisms to detect
the execution of unauthorized instructions that leverages the
information obtained by static timing analysis. An architectural
approach that aims to create hardware/software mechanisms
to detect anomalies is studied by Yoon et al. [15]. Threats
to covert timing channels for RTS has been addressed in
prior research for fixed-priority systems [39]. A scheduler-
level modification is proposed in literature [48] that alters
thread blocks (that may leak information) to the idle thread –
the aim is to avoid the exploitation of timing channels while
achieving real-time guarantees. The authors also developed
locking protocols for preventing covert channels [49].
Issues regarding information leakage through storage timing
channels (e.g., caches) in RTS, with different security levels,
has been studied [8], [9] and further generalized [50]. The au-
thors proposed a modification to the fixed-priority scheduling
algorithm and introduced a state cleanup mechanism to miti-
gate information leakage through shared resources. However,
this leakage prevention comes at a cost of reduced schedulabil-
ity and is focused on fixed-priority systems. Besides, they may
not be completely effective against timing inference attacks
that focus on deterministic scheduling behaviors. REORDER
works to break this inherent predictability of real-time schedul-
ing by introducing randomness.
Bao et al.[51] model the behavior of the attacker and intro-
duce a scheduling algorithm for a system with aperiodic tasks
that have soft deadlines. They provide a trade-off between
side-channel information leakage and the number of deadline
misses. To the best of our knowledge REORDER is the first
work that focuses on obfuscating schedule timing information
for dynamic priority RTS with hard deadlines.
IX. CONCLUSION
Malicious attacks on systems with safety-critical real-time
requirements could be catastrophic since the attackers can
destabilize the system by inferring the critical task execution
patterns. In this work we focus on a widely used optimal real-
time scheduling policy and make progress towards developing
a solution for timing side-channel attacks. By using the ap-
proaches developed in this work (along with our open-source
Linux kernel implementation) engineers of the systems can
now have enough flexibility, as part of their design, to secure
such safety-critical systems. While our initial findings are
promising, we believe this is only a start towards developing
a unified secure real-time framework in general.
APPENDIX
A. Calculation of an Upper Bound of the Response Time
Under EDF, the response time calculation involves comput-
ing the busy-period16 of a task’s instance with deadline less
than or equal to that instance [36]. Real-time theory uses the
notion of interference, e.g., the amount of time a ready job
of τi is blocked due to the execution of other higher priority
jobs. To calculate the WCIB of a task, we measure the worst-
case interference from its higher priority jobs. Note that with
arbitrary priority inversions, any job could be delayed because
of chain reactions, i.e., some low priority jobs in lp(τi), delay
the higher priority jobs (e.g., τj ,∀dj < di), that in turn delay τi
– hence τi may need more than its WCRT as calculated by the
response time analysis [53], [35]. This phenomenon is known
as back-to-back hit [53] and can be addressed by considering
an extra instance of higher priority jobs. Therefore, without
any assumptions on the execution patterns of lp(τi), for a
given release time t = a we can calculate the upper bound of
interference [35], [36], [53] experienced by τi as follows:
Ii(a) = ∑
j≠i,Dj≤a+Dimin{⌈DiTj ⌉ + 1,1 + ⌊a+Di−DjTj ⌋ + 1}Cj . (3)
Note that the extra execution times (e.g., +1 in Eq. (3)) are
added in the interference calculation to prevent the effects of
back-to-back hit from higher priority jobs. For a given release
time a, the response time of τi [35], [36] (relative to a) is given
by: Ri(a) = max{Ci,Wi(a) − a} where Wi(a) denotes the
workload of τi and calculated by Wi(a) = (⌊ aTi ⌋ + 1)Ci +
Ii(a). Finally we can compute the upper bound of WCRT of
τi as follows: Ri = max{Ri(a)} , 0 ≤ a < R̂ − Ci where
R̂ is calculated by an iterative fixed point search, that is
R̂ = r(k+1) = r(k) for some iteration k where r(⋅) is the
upper bound of any busy-period length. We can calculate
this upper bound using the following recurrence relation:
16A busy-period [52] of τi is the interval [t0, t] within which jobs with
priority higher or equal than τi are processed throughout [t0, t] but no jobs
with priority higher or equal than τi are processed in t0 − , t0) or (t, t+ )
for a sufficiently small .
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r(0) = ∑
τi∈ΓCi, r(k+1) = ∑τi∈Γ ⌈ r(k)Ti ⌉Ci. This sequence r(k)
converges to R̂ in a finite number of steps if we assume that
the taskset is schedulable (i.e., ∑
τi∈Γ CiTi ≤ 1) [36].
B. Limitations of Existing Entropy Calculation Approach
In order to evaluate the performance of a randomized sched-
uler, we need to have a measure of the randomness of the out-
put of the scheduler. For a taskset with hyperperiod of length
L, define the L dimensional random vector Sk = [Sk1 ,⋯, SkL]
representing the schedule of hyperperiod k, where the random
variable Skt ∈ {τ0, ..., τn} denotes the task (including the idle
task) scheduled at the t-th slot of hyperperiod k. Note that the
random vectors Sk for different values of k are independent
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables. Therefore
the average randomness of the whole output is equal to the
randomness in a single hyperperiod.
In the past [24], researchers defined the entropy of the
schedule Sk using Shannon entropy [46, Ch. 2] as a measure
of the randomness, i.e., H(Sk) = −∑
sk1∈{τ0,⋯,τn}⋯ ∑skL∈{τ0,⋯,τn}P(Sk =[s1,⋯, sL]) × log2 P(Sk = [sk1 ,⋯, skL]) with the assumption
that 0 × log2 0 = 0. There are two major issues in calculating
the schedule entropy using the above method.
First, in order to obtain H(Sk), we need to calculate the
distribution P(Sk) – calculating this distribution has exponen-
tial complexity and is not computationally tractable in practice.
Also, estimating this distribution requires a very high number
of samples. To address this problem, we proposed [24] to use
the sum of the entropy of random variables Skt , t ∈ {1, .., L} as
the measure of randomness (referred to as upper-approximated
schedule entropy): H̃(Sk) = ∑Lt=1H(Skt ), where H(Skt ) =− ∑
skt ∈{τ0,⋯,τn}P(Skt = skt ) log2 P(Skt = skt ). Note that for pi = 0,
choosing m = 1 gives us Ĥ(Sk,m,pi,K) = H̃(Sk) and choos-
ing m = L outputs Ĥ(Sk,m,pi,K) → H(Sk), as K → ∞.
The main limitations of upper approximated schedule entropy
H̃(Sk) is that it completely ignores the regularities that exist
in Sk due to the dependencies among random variables. For
instance, suppose a taskset contains two tasks: Γ = {τ1, τ2} and
a schedule for first 5 slots in 2 individual hyperperiods is as
follows: S1 ∈ {(τ1, τ2, τ1, τ2, τ1), (τ2, τ1, τ2, τ1, τ2)}, assuming
each vector with equal probability. Let us consider another
schedule S2 that has all possible 25 vectors of τ1 and τ2 of
length 5 with equal probability. Then H̃(S1) = H̃(S2) even
though the randomness of S2 is much higher (i.e., H(S1) = 1
while H(S2) = 5). Therefore, H̃(Sk) cannot capture the
randomness correctly.
Second, consider an instance where many of the schedules
produced in different hyperperiods have very similar patterns
in the first few slots and different patterns in the latter
slots (or vice versa). In such cases H(Sk) cannot capture
the similarities and considers the observed hyperperiods as
distinct ones – this leads us to search for dissimilarities in
intervals smaller than the whole length of the hyperperiod.
In what follows we propose an entropy measure to capture
the randomness of a schedule using the concept of limited
size intervals that resolves both the aforementioned issues and
provides a better way to quantitatively compute randomness.
C. Comparison With True and Approximate Entropy
Recall that obtaining the true entropy (e.g., H(⋅)) is not
feasible in practice since it has an asymptotic complex-
ity. Therefore, we compare approximate entropy (e.g., Ĥ(⋅)
with H(⋅) by measuring the correlation observed from small
tasksets. We generate tasksets that have [3,5] tasks with
Ti ∈ {2,4,5,10,20} where the task utilizations and WCET
are generated using methods from Section IV-C1. Each taskset
has a common hyperperiod L = 20 (allowing us to evaluate
enough schedules for a reasonable time). For each taskset we
observe the schedule for K = 1500 hyperperiods and estimate
the true entropy. Given a fixed taskset, generating unique
schedules (e.g., K → ∞) leads to actual entropy H(⋅) since
more tasks appear at each slot. For approximate entropy Ĥ(⋅)
we set interval length m = ⌈0.35L⌉ and dissimilarity threshold
pi = 0.1L by trial-and-error and measure the correlation.
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Fig. 7: The correlation between true and approximate entropy (the
values are normalized to [0,1]).
The true and approximate entropy do not depend on the
length of the hyperperiod – instead, the approximation error
(as can be seen from Fig. 7) is due to the assumption of
independence between intervals. While we observe that the
correlation between true and approximate entropy is relatively
high (e.g., ≈0.82) the approximated schedule entropy, Ĥ(⋅)
should be used to compare the relative randomness of two
schedules (that is also the focus of our evaluation).
D. REORDER Variables in Real-time Linux Implementation
The implementation of the REORDER protocol on the Linux
kernel modifies four files:
● include/linux/sched.h (task/job-specific variables in-
troduced in Section V-D1).● kernel/sched/sched.h (scheduler-specific variables, as
presented below).● kernel/sched/core.c (scheduling functions that govern
all schedulers in the kernel).● kernel/sched/deadline.c (scheduling functions for
SCHED_DEADLINE – the main REORDER algorithms were
implemented here).
Besides the task-specific variables introduced in Sec-
tion V-D1, there are scheduler-specific variables declared and
used in our implementation, as shown in the listing below.
struct dl_rq {
....
/⁎ scheduler specific parameters ⁎/
struct hrtimer reorder_pi_timer; // schedule timer
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u64 reorder_pi_timer_start_time; // timer start
bool reorder_idle_time_acting; // idle status
// scheme (Base , IT , FT, UTR)
enum reorder_scheduling_mode reorder_mode;
....
};
The variable reorder_mode is used to determine the ran-
domization scheme to be used in the scheduler. The enumera-
tion for the scheme options are defined in the same source file
(kernel/sched/sched.h) and shown in the following listing.
enum reorder_scheduling_mode {
REORDER_NORMAL , // task only randomization
REORDER_IDLE_TIME , // + idle time scheduling
REORDER_FINE_GRAINED ,// + fine -grained switching
REORDER_RECLAMATION // + unused time reclamation
};
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